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Abstract
Market share and quality, or customer satisfaction, go together. Yet inferring
one from the other appears difficult. Indeed, such an inference would need detailed
information about customer behavior, and might be clouded by modes of behavior
such as herding (following popularity) or elitism, where customers avoid popular
products. We investigate a fixed-price model where customers are informed about
their history with products and about market share data. We find that it is in
fact correct to make a Bayesian inference that the product with the higher market
share has the better quality under few and unrestrictive assumptions on customer
behavior.
JEL codes: D11, D40, L10.
1. Introduction
Common wisdom holds that a full restaurant is a good one, or certainly better
than its empty neighbor. The purpose of this paper is to discover some minimal
assumptions on the rationality of customers under which this folk wisdom can
be mathematically justified. For example, this conclusion certainly does not hold
in places where the (admittedly strange) general preference is for food of poor
taste. We formulate a simple model of a market in which customers have several
products available to them. Each product has an innate unknown quality which
is the probability that a customer who consumes it is satisfied. We find very mild
sufficient conditions under which a larger market share indicates higher product
quality.
Intuitively, quality goes hand in hand with market share, and indeed a man-
ufacturer’s pursuit of quality is usually rationalized as a way of maximizing eco-
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nomic benefit. While not conclusive, empirical studies (e.g. Anderson et. al.
[Anderson,1994], Rust and Zahorik [Rust,1993]) generally support a positive cor-
relation between quality and market share.
Market share affects real or perceived quality through various mechanisms,
including the creation of network externalities. Yet the direction of this poten-
tial impact is ambiguous in the literature. An empirical study by Hellofs and
Jacobson[Hellofs,1999] concludes “The view that . . .market share and product
quality are reinforcing mechanisms . . . seems premature”. Our study makes room
for both positive and negative impact, through the modeling of “herders” and
“elitists”.
We model quality as a probability for customer satisfaction. We consider qual-
ity to be a hidden, constant attribute of a product, which may be inferred, but
not directly observed or learned from an authority. This is a widespread scenario
that customers realistically face. In the exceptions, e.g. when offered a Ferrari
and a Fiat, price or other differentiation will typically also exist. The extent to
which customers may remain unaware of quality has been studied by, e.g., Mitra
and Golder[Mitra,2006], who showed that only a fraction of actual quality change
registers with customers, and then typically with a delay of years.
Caminal and Vives[Caminal,1996] studied the effect of firms’ signaling of qual-
ity on imperfectly informed customers. The signaling is facilitated by strategic
price reductions, which increase perceptions of quality by increasing market share.
As customers best-respond with their own strategy, in one possible equilibrium
market share indicates quality. Our motivation is different. We seek to illuminate
the inter-relationship of market share and quality under the least possible restric-
tions on customer behavior, and independently of signaling, for several reasons: (i)
A large body of economic research indicates that customers’ decisions use bounded
rationality. (ii) Strategic signaling of quality is absent when there is no interest or
possibility of doing so, e.g. when prices are set by a regulator (health insurance),
or by a non-profit (museum entry tickets), or by a channel (movie tickets), or due
to the shortness of the interaction (shore restaurants serving a boatload of tourists
stopping for lunch will inevitably have same prices). (iii) The sparseness of the-
oretical results, and the inconclusiveness of empirical results, increases the value
of a basic result. Especially so since, as we will point out, and as the extensive
literature on herding shows, there is nothing simple or inevitable about it.
We ascribe to each customer a strategy of whether to consume each of the
products, guided by market share and by one’s own past personal history. When
described as a behavioral strategy, i.e. by probabilities for consuming the product
2
for each of the customer’s information sets, we call it the customer’s partiality
strategy for that product. No connection between consumption of different prod-
ucts is assumed. E.g., a customer may consume all products simultaneously or
none. We make no assumption that customers have uniform strategies, or that
any customer’s strategy is optimal.
We make two mild assumptions on customers’ strategies, that customers (i) do
not prefer negative over positive experiences with products, and (ii) do not prefer
products with low market share over those with a higher one. Additionally, we
assume an undifferentiated market, where products are a priori equal in the eyes
of customers. Under these assumptions we can show the validity of inferences from
market share to quality.
The current work also sets the ground for future work that will include variable
prices. A close inspection of our methodology reveals its suitability for such a
task. It is particularly encouraging to see its success in reaching general results
from a few weak assumptions. One of our results, that the probability for market
leadership increases with quality (Theorem 4) applies to variable-price markets. In
the Discussion we suggest a path to extending the main result for variable prices.
Though our research is not framed in the canonical terms of action payoffs and
Bayesian updating/learning, it in fact conforms to it: A preference for satisfaction
over dissatisfaction is all we need to assume about payoffs, and, the monotonicity
property, which is introduced in the next section, has a property common to all
Bayesian updating rules: A strictly superior sequence of events results in a superior
posterior.
1.1. Strategy Dependence on Personal History
When customers (illogically) prefer dissatisfaction over satisfaction, market
share clearly does not indicate quality. There are multiple ways to exclude or
limit this from our framework. For example, we could require that customers’
strategies be consistent with their average satisfaction with products. But this is
already restrictive: It is, for example, not unreasonable to prefer a product used
satisfactorily 18 times out of 20 trials over a product used just once satisfactorily;
Or to give more weight to more recent trials.
Therefore we adopt a tamer restriction, which we call monotonicity: Namely,
that customers recall the outcomes of their experiences with products, in the order
that they happened, and if that history is definitely superior, on an experience-by-
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experience basis, their partiality strategy1 to the product will be equal or higher.
As an example, if a customer has a fail-success-fail history with a product (on the
3 occasions she elected to use it), then her partiality strategy after such a history
will not be higher than if her history would have been fail-success-success, as the
latter is superior by having a success where the former has failure, and is otherwise
the same. No restriction is made on strategy after, e.g., the history success-fail-
success (incomparable on an experience-by-experience basis), or success-success
(incomparable due to a different number of experiences). Nor does it restrict the
customer’s strategy to other products, or other customers’ strategies, as each can
be formed independently within our framework.
This is possibly the lightest restriction on customer strategies we could make
that conforms to common sense. When customers’ strategies are guided solely by
their history, we show it is sufficient to establish our result. Even for this restricted
scenario, the conclusion is deeper than suggested by the assertion’s simplicity:
Attempted proofs must deal with a side result to which we allude in the Discussion:
When quality varies with time, inferences from quality to market share or vice versa
are, as a rule, invalid.
1.2. Strategy Dependence on Market Share
Customers may base their strategy on market share itself. This may take sev-
eral forms: Customers may be fully or partially informed of market share, by,
e.g. knowing product sales figures, or the ranking of the top-selling products.
Smallwood and Conlisk[Smallwood,1979] considered a market that evolves based
on products having an intrinsic probability for breakdown and customers switching
products randomly weighed by a function of market share. The present authors
[Ban,2011] considered a system where customers are influenced by history and
reputation, where “reputation” under a suitable choice of model parameters rep-
resents market share. Word-of-mouth, i.e. asking or following others, is in effect a
sampling of market share. Ellison and Fudenberg[Ellison,1995] considered a model
of learning involving both personal history and word-of-mouth communication in
which technologies perform stochastically based on an underlying quality parame-
ter. Information cascades, starting with Bikhchandani et. al.[Bikhchandani,1992],
consider the inferences that observers can make on the quality of a service based
on the customers queuing for that service and how informed those customers are
known to be. They show this leads to herding, the phenomenon where customers
1Here and hereafter we use “partiality strategy” as shorthand for the probability of choosing
the action of consumption under that strategy.
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accumulate due to the presence of others. Smallwood and Conlisk[Smallwood,1979]
as well as Ban and Linial[Ban,2011] also show that lower quality products can main-
tain higher market share indefinitely. Lest the reader suspect that the main result
is self-evident when customers are Bayesian, since “better quality always wins with
Bayesian learning”, note that this assumption is refuted by the above cited papers
which are framed in strictly Bayesian terms. This false intuition is dispelled as
well by the k-armed bandit problem, where an unlucky start may cause a Bayesian
player to miss his best option for a long time or even indefinitely.
Another potential feature of customer behavior we call elitism: Customers who
intentionally avoid the most popular products. This may be due to a wish to
differentiate oneself from the crowd, or to a belief that popular choices are second-
rate, or any other reason.
Herding and elitism seem to cast doubt on our thesis. Herding, in particular,
seems to pull the rug from underneath our sought conclusion. For example, if
more than half of the customers at any point in time consume the market-leading
product, and it alone, then market leadership is self-perpetuating regardless of
product qualities and regardless of how other customers behave. No monotonicity
assumptions are violated (for added credibility, assume leader-following customers
are one-shot with no experiences to rely on), yet market share indicates nothing re-
garding product qualities. However, as we demonstrate, herding poses no problem
to a market-to-quality inference: While a lower-quality product may sometimes
prevail in market share, this will always have a lower probability than the alter-
native, and market share data per se is of no help in recognizing that such an
anomaly is occurring. Defining a customer to be weakly herding if greater market
share makes her more likely to consume a product, or has no effect on her behavior,
we demonstrate that when all customers are weakly herding (in addition to being
monotone on their product histories), market share is a valid signal for quality.
As for elitism, we believe, but do not analyze in the current paper, that if
outweighed (in some sense) by herding, our thesis is still valid. Markets in which
customer elitism is dominant turn out to be chaotic and difficult to analyze. In the
Discussion we give an example where such a market does not adhere to our thesis.
However, such markets seem far-fetched and so of low economic significance.
1.3. No Other Differentiation
Our result applies to undifferentiated markets, where all products are a priori
equal in the eyes of customers. When customers distinguish between products by
price, brand name, etc., or in captive markets, market share may be a reflection
of the existing differentiation rather than of quality.
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In our model, this translates to a requirement of anonymity of products in cus-
tomer strategies, meaning that customers’ strategies are invariant under a change
of product labels.
1.4. Organization of this paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 and 3 analyze markets
where customers are guided entirely by their product history, with section 2 de-
voted to describing the model and section 3 stating and proving our proposition
in such markets. Subsequently we analyze markets where customers are aware of
product market share and take it into account, with section 4 devoted to refining
the model for such markets, while section 5 states and proves our proposition.
Formally speaking the results in Sections 4 and 5 subsume those of Sections 2 and
3, but we feel that this organization of the material makes it easier for the reader
to follow. Conclusions are given in section 6.
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2. Basic Model, When Only History Matters
In our model, customers make decisions regarding products in rounds of discrete
time t = 1, 2, . . .. At each round, a customer has an action set {C,N}, where C :=
consume the product, N := do not consume the product. If she consumes the
product, she will, with probability given by the product’s quality q ∈ [0, 1], be
satisfied, in which case the round is called an S-round, or else dissatisfied, in
which case the round is called an F -round. If she chooses not to consume the
product, the round is called an N-round.
A customer’s t-deep history with a product is a member of Ht := {S,N, F}
t.
The set of all histories are denoted H :=
⋃∞
k=0Hk. For Z ∈ Ht we mark Z’s
depth |Z| := t. Z is composed of events, Z = (Z(1), . . . , Z(t)) with Z(k) standing
for the event in round k. Zk stands for the sequence of events until round k, i.e.
Zk = (Z1, . . . , Zk) ∈ Hk, so that Z = Z
t.
The customer’s partiality strategy, σ : H → [0, 1], is her behavioral strategy
given her information set, which in this basic model is her history with the product
at the time of decision. The partiality strategy is completely specified by specifying
σ(Z), the probability for action C, for each history Z ∈ H.
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For V ∈ {S,N, F}, ZV stands for (Z(1), . . . , Z(t), V ) ∈ Ht+1, with Z(k) stand-
ing for the event in round k.
We further define S(Z) (resp. F (Z), N(Z)) as the number of S-rounds (resp.
F,N -rounds) in Z, i.e., the number of indices i for which Z(i) = S (resp. F,N).
The consumption of Z is defined as con(Z) := S(Z) + F (Z). The digest of Z,
denoted dig(Z) ∈ Hcon(Z), is defined as the history that we obtain when we omit
all the N -rounds from Z while maintaining the order of the remaining rounds.
Let Z1, Z2 ∈ Ht, with con(Z1) = con(Z2), and letD1 := dig(Z1), D2 := dig(Z2).
We say that Z1 is superior to Z2, denoted Z1  Z2 if there is no index i for which
D1(i) = F and D2(i) = S.
A partiality strategy σ(·) is called monotone if
σ(Z1) ≥ σ(Z2) whenever Z1  Z2.
2 (2.1)
3. The Main Theorem When Only Product History Matters
In the current section we focus on the situation of a monotone partiality strat-
egy that depends only on history. What can be said about the probability that the
consumption up to time t, is ≥ x for arbitrary t and x? As the following theorem
shows, this probability is a non-decreasing function of the product quality q.
Theorem 1. Fix a monotone partiality strategy σ, and nonnegative integers t, x.
Then
d
dq
P
[
con(Z) ≥ x|Z ∈ Ht
]
≥ 0 (3.1)
where the probability space is H.
Proof. We define a Markov chain on histories, i.e. a Markov chain with state
space H that describes the possible transitions between histories and their proba-
bilities. All transitions are from a member Z ∈ Ht to an extension Z
′ ∈ Ht+1 with
the following probabilities
Z → ZS with probability q · σ(Z)
Z → ZN with probability 1− σ(Z)
Z → ZF with probability (1− q) · σ(Z)
(3.2)
Consider the probability of reaching Z ∈ H as we start from the empty history
and move along the Markov chain. It is convenient to express this probability as
P[Z; q] := c(Z)Q(Z; q)
2In more general models where the customer’s strategy is dependent on more information,
e.g. history of other products, or market shares, the generalization of this will be “all else being
equal”. E.g. σ(Z1, X, Y, . . .) ≥ σ(Z2, X, Y, . . .) whenever Z1  Z2, where X,Y, . . . denote any
other information-set variables. See e.g. the definition of monotonicity in Section 4.
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Q(Z; q) := qS(Z)(1− q)F (Z).
We refer to c(Z) as the ex-ante function corresponding to strategy σ(·). Following
from (3.2), its value is recursively defined by:
c(Zk) =


1 k = 0
σ(Zk−1)c(Zk−1) Z(k) 6= N[
1− σ(Zk−1)
]
c(Zk−1) Z(k) = N
(3.3)
For example c(FNSSN) = σ(∅)[1−σ(F )]σ(FN)σ(FNS)[1−σ(FNSS)] where
∅ denotes the empty history. Observe that c(Z) is a product of |Z| factors. The
factor has the form σ(·) for each consumption event, and 1−σ(·) where the history
has an N -event. The arguments of σ in the factors run over all |Z| tails of Z.
Let q′, q ∈ [0, 1] s.t. q′ > q. For the proof, we will construct a joint distribution
of two types of history:
1. The distribution of histories ∈ Ht under product quality q. Histories from
this distribution are denoted by Z.
2. The distribution of histories ∈ Ht under product quality q
′. Histories from
this distribution are denoted by Z ′.
The joint distribution is defined for the purpose of our analysis. It should
be considered a proof technique and not a representation of any real customer
behavior.
The construction assigns to each pair of histories Z,Z ′ ∈ Ht a joint probabil-
ity f(Z,Z ′) ∈ [0, 1]. Assuming f(Z,Z ′) to be tabulated in a table whose rows
correspond to values of Z and columns correspond to values of Z ′, a valid joint
distribution must have rows summing to the correct history event probabilities in
both rows and columns, i.e. for every Z ∈ Ht:∑
Z′∈Ht
f(Z,Z ′) = P[Z; q] = c(Z)Q(Z; q) (3.4)
and for every Z ′ ∈ Ht:∑
Z∈Ht
f(Z,Z ′) = P[Z
′; q′] = c(Z ′)Q(Z ′; q′) (3.5)
Our construction restricts the joint distribution’s support (i.e. those pairs Z,Z ′
where f(Z,Z ′) > 0) by the following criterion:
Criterion 1. For every 0 < k ≤ t, there exists 0 < l ≤ k s.t. dig(Z ′l)  dig(Zk).
Consequently, for every 0 < k ≤ t, con(Z ′k) ≥ con(Zk), and con(Z ′k) =
con(Zk)⇒ Z ′k  Zk ⇒ σ(Z ′k) ≥ σ(Zk).
We specify the joint distribution in two different ways: In the first, it is specified
how the row marginal probabilities, i.e. probabilities of Z events, are split into the
row’s individual probabilities. The construction will explicitly guarantee (3.4) and
Criterion 1. In the second, it is specified how the column marginal probabilities,
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i.e. probabilities of Z ′ events, are split into the column’s individual probabilities.
The construction will explicitly guarantee (3.5) and Criterion 1. Finally, we will
demonstrate that the two constructions coincide and yield the same probabilities,
thus proving that it is in fact a joint probability fulfilling (3.4), (3.5) and Criterion
1.
The first, row construction, is specified by:
Let Z,Z ′, X, Y ∈ Ht (we use X in place of Z, and Y in place of Z
′ for better
readability), and 0 < k ≤ t. We define below probability functions g1(X, Y, k), h1(X, Y, k).
Based on these, the probabilities f(Z,Z ′) will be given by:
g(X, Y, k) :=
[
g1(X, Y, k) Y (k) 6= N
1− g1(X, Y, k) Y (k) = N
]
(3.6)
h(X, Y, k) =

 h1(X, Y, k) Y (k) = S1− h1(X, Y, k) Y (k) = F
1 Y (k) = N

 (3.7)
r(X, Y, k) := g(X, Y, k)h(X, Y, k) (3.8)
R(Z,Z ′) :=
t∏
k=1
r(Z,Z ′, k) (3.9)
f(Z,Z ′) := R(Z,Z ′)P[Z; q] (3.10)
From Equations (3.6) to (3.8) we derive:
r(X, Y, k) =

 g(X, Y, k)h(X, Y, k) Y (k) = Sg(X, Y, k)[1− h(X, Y, k)] Y (k) = F
1− g(X, Y, k) Y (k) = N

 (3.11)
The three values of which sum to 1. It follows that for every given values of Z
and Z ′k−1 there holds
∑
r(Z,Z ′, k) = 1 where the sum is over Z ′(k) = N, S and
F . By (3.9) it follows that: ∑
Z′∈Ht
R(Z,Z ′) = 1 (3.12)
from which (3.4) follows. Note that this holds regardless of the choice of g1, h1,
which is made so as to guarantee that Criterion 1 holds. The definition of g1 and
h1 follows:
Mark c := con(Xk−1), c′ := con(Y k−1):
g1(X, Y, k) =


[
1 X(k) 6= N
σ(Y k−1)−σ(Xk−1)
1−σ(Xk−1)
X(k) = N
]
c = c′
σ(Y k−1) c 6= c′

 (3.13)
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h1(X, Y, k) =


[
1 [dig(X)](c+ 1) = S
q′−q
1−q
[dig(X)](c+ 1) = F
]
c < con(X)
q′ c ≥ con(X)

 (3.14)
An examination of (3.6) to (3.14) leads to the following observations:
• The definition of g and g1 insures that in r’s support con(Z
′k) ≥ con(Zk) for
every k ∈ [1, t]: In case Z and Z ′ have the same consumption at round k− 1
and X(k) 6= N , there is zero probability that Y (k) = N . The definition of h
and h1 insures that in r’s support nowhere do l ∈ [1, con(Z)] [dig(Z)](l) = S
and [dig(Z ′)](l) = F hold simultaneously: If [dig(X)](c + 1) = S, then
with probability zero does [dig(Y )](c + 1) = Y (k) equal F . This is exactly
our notion of history superiority, denoted by the relation . Consequently
Criterion 1 holds in the support of f .
• As q′ > q, 0 ≤ h(Z,Z ′, k) ≤ 1, and as Criterion 1 specifies Z ′k  Zk whenever
con(Z ′k) = con(Zk), 0 ≤ g(Z,Z ′, k) ≤ 1. Therefore 0 ≤ R(Z,Z ′) ≤ 1 for
every Z,Z ′ that satisfy Criterion 1.
In summary, (3.10) defines a matrix f(Z,Z ′) of non-negative values, which may
be non-zero only where Criterion 1 holds, each row summing to the row marginal
probability of Z.
We now define a second construction based on columns (values of Z ′). The
overall structure of this construction is similar to the previous one.
Let Z,Z ′, X, Y ∈ Ht, and 0 < k ≤ t. We define below probability functions
g2(X, Y, k), h2(X, Y, k). Based on these, the probabilities f
′(Z,Z ′) will be given
by:
g′(X, Y, k) :=
[
g2(X, Y, k) X(k) 6= N
1− g2(X, Y, k) X(k) = N
]
(3.15)
h′(X, Y, k) =

 h2(X, Y, k) X(k) = S1− h2(X, Y, k) X(k) = F
1 X(k) = N

 (3.16)
r′(X, Y, k) := g′(X, Y, k)h′(X, Y, k) (3.17)
R′(Z,Z ′) :=
t∏
k=1
r′(Z,Z ′, k) (3.18)
f ′(Z,Z ′) := R′(Z,Z ′)P[Z
′; q′] (3.19)
As before, Equations (3.15) to (3.22) yield
∑
r′(Z,Z ′, k) = 1 where the sum is
over Z(k) = N, S and F . By (3.18) it follows that:∑
Z∈Ht
R′(Z,Z ′) = 1 (3.20)
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from which (3.5) follows, irrespective of the choice of g2 or h2, which we define
next:
Mark c := con(Xk−1), c′ := con(Y k−1):
g2(X, Y, k) =


[
0 Y (k) = N
σ(Xk−1)
σ(Y k−1)
Y (k) 6= N
]
c = c′
σ(Xk−1) c 6= c′

 (3.21)
h2(X, Y, k) =


[
0 [dig(Y )](c+ 1) = F
q
q′
[dig(Y )](c+ 1) = S
]
c < con(X)
1 c ≥ con(X)

 (3.22)
The choice of g2 guarantees that in r
′’s support the consumption requirement
of Criterion 1 holds, while the choice of h2 guarantees that the monotonicity re-
quirement of Criterion 1 also holds. As q′ > q, 0 ≤ h′(Z,Z ′, k) ≤ 1, and from
monotonicity it follows that 0 ≤ g′(Z,Z ′, k) ≤ 1. Therefore 0 ≤ R′(Z,Z ′) ≤ 1 for
every Z,Z ′ that satisfy Criterion 1.
In summary, (3.19) defines a matrix f ′(Z,Z ′) of non-negative values, which
may be non-zero only where Criterion 1 holds, each row summing to the column
marginal probability of Z.
We now show that both constructions generate the same probabilities, f(Z,Z ′) =
f ′(Z,Z ′), and that therefore the construction constitutes a joint probability dis-
tribution whose support satisfies Criterion 1:
We use (3.6) and (3.15) to calculate g(Z,Z
′,k)
g′(Z,Z′,k)
. Where Criterion 1 holds:3
g(Z,Z ′, k)
g′(Z,Z ′, k)
=


1−σ(Z′k−1)
1−σ(Zk−1)
Z ′(k) = N,Z(k) = N
1−σ(Z′k−1)
σ(Zk−1)
Z ′(k) = N,Z(k) 6= N
σ(Z′k−1)
1−σ(Zk−1)
Z ′(k) 6= N,Z(k) = N
σ(Z′k−1)
σ(Zk−1)
Z ′(k) 6= N,Z(k) 6= N

 =
c(Z ′k)
c(Z ′k−1)
/ c(Zk)
c(Zk−1)
(3.23)
We define a pairing [1, t] 7→ [1, t], based on Z,Z ′ as follows:
• The rounds where Z has a consumption event (Z(k) 6= N) are paired with
the corresponding rounds of the first con(Z) consumption events in Z ′. I.e.
if con(Zk−1) = con(Z ′k
′−1) = l− 1, con(Zk) = con(Z ′k
′
) = l, then k is paired
with k′.
• Any con(Z ′)−con(Z) N -rounds of Z are paired with rounds of the [con(Z)+
1]’th to con(Z ′)’th consumption event in Z ′.
• The remaining t − con(Z ′) rounds of Z and Z ′ are all N -rounds, and are
paired in any order.
3In the case c = c′, Z(k) 6= N,Z ′(k) = N this expression evaluates to 0
0
, but this case is ruled
out by Criterion 1.
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We use (3.7) and (3.16) to calculate h(Z,Z
′,k)
h′(Z,Z′,k′)
where k → k′ is part of the above
pairing. Where Criterion 1 holds:
h(Z,Z ′, k)
h′(Z,Z ′, k′)
=


[
1 Z(k) = N
]
Z ′(k′) = N[
1−q′
1−q
Z(k) = F
1− q′ Z(k) = N
]
Z ′(k′) = F

q′
1−q
Z(k) = F
q′
q
Z(k) = S
q′ Z(k) = N

 Z ′(k′) = S


=
Q(Z ′k
′
; q′)
Q(Z ′k′−1; q′)
/ Q(Zk; q)
Q(Zk−1; q)
(3.24)
Combining (3.9), (3.18), (3.23) and (3.24), we calculate:
R(Z,Z ′)
R′(Z,Z ′)
=
c(Z ′)
c(Z)
Q(Z ′; q′)
Q(Z; q)
=
P[Z ′; q′]
P[Z; q]
(3.25)
Recalling (3.10), (3.19) we conclude f(Z,Z ′) = f ′(Z,Z ′). Therefore the two
constructions are the same, as we sought to show, and therefore form a joint
distribution with support given by Criterion 1.
The theorem now follows: In the joint distribution matrix, consider a minor
with rows for which con(Z) ≥ x, and columns for which con(Z ′) ≥ x. Since
Criterion 1 requires con(Z ′) ≥ con(Z), the minor contains all the support of each
included row. Therefore: ∑
con(Z)≥x
P[Z; q] ≤
∑
con(Z′)≥x
P[Z
′; q′] (3.26)
Since this is true for any q′ > q, P
[
con(Z) ≥ x|Z ∈ Ht
]
is non-decreasing in
the product quality, as the theorem asserts. 
It follows from Theorem 1 that the expected consumption is non-decreasing in
the quality:
Corollary 1. If the partiality strategy is monotone, then for any time t:
d
dq
E
[
con(Z)|Z ∈ Ht
]
≥ 0 (3.27)
where the probability space is H.
Proof. Since:
E
[
con(Z)|Z ∈ Ht
]
=
∞∑
x=1
P
[
con(Z) ≥ x|Z ∈ Ht
]
(3.28)
This follows from Theorem 1.
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Having proved Theorem 1 for the consumption of a single customer, we state
and prove an equivalent theorem for an entire market, i.e. that, provided each
customer’s partiality strategy is monotone, a product’s market share (here defined
as its total consumption) stochastically dominates the market share of a product
of lesser quality:
Theorem 2. Let each of n customers have a monotone partiality strategy. Given
a time t and an integer x:
d
dq
P
[ n∑
j=1
con(Zj) ≥ x|∀j ∈ [n], Zj ∈ Ht
]
≥ 0 (3.29)
where the probability space is Hn.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on n. For n = 1 this is just Theo-
rem 1. Assume the statement true for up to n − 1 customers. Mark an(x) :=
P
[ n∑
j=1
con(Zj) ≥ x|∀j ∈ [n], Zj ∈ Ht
]
and b(y) := P
[
Zn ≥ y|Zn ∈ Ht
]
. Then:
d
dq
an(x) =
d
dq
∞∑
y=−∞
an−1(x− y)P
[
Zn = y|Zn ∈ Ht
]
=
=
d
dq
∞∑
y=−∞
an−1(x− y)b(y)−
d
dq
∞∑
y=−∞
an−1(x− y)b(y + 1) =
=
∞∑
y=−∞
d
dq
an−1(x− y)b(y) +
∞∑
y=−∞
an−1(x− y)
d
dq
b(y)−
−
∞∑
y=−∞
d
dq
an−1(x− y)b(y + 1)−
∞∑
y=−∞
an−1(x− y)
d
dq
b(y + 1)
Changing variables in the last term y + 1→ y and combining, this results in:
∞∑
y=−∞
d
dq
an−1(x− y)P
[
Zn = y|Zn ∈ Ht
]
+
∞∑
y=−∞
P
[n−1∑
j=1
con(Zj) = x− y|∀j ∈ [n− 1], Zj ∈ Ht
] d
dq
b(y) ≥ 0
since all factors in the above expression are non-negative.
The main result can now be stated and proved: If two products are inter-
changeable in the eyes of the customers, and if there is no prior cause to believe
that one of the products has the better quality, then from the observation of a
higher market share for one of the products one can infer that it has the better
quality.
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Theorem 3. Let the partiality strategies of all customers for products 1 and 2
be monotone, and let each customer’s strategy for product 1 be the same as for
product 2. Let products 1, 2 have possibly different qualities q1, q2 respectively, with
symmetric prior. Let the history of customer j ∈ [n] with product i ∈ [m] be
Zij ∈ Ht. Then:
P
[
q1 ≥ q2|
n∑
j=1
con(Z1j) >
n∑
j=1
con(Z2j)
]
≥ P
[
q2 ≥ q1|
n∑
j=1
con(Z1j) >
n∑
j=1
con(Z2j)
]
where the probability space is Hmn.
Proof. Mark ω1 :=
n∑
j=1
con(Z1j) and ω2 :=
n∑
j=1
con(Z2j).
As the products are interchangeable P[ω1 > ω2|q1 = q2] = P[ω2 > ω1|q1 = q2].
By theorem 2:
P[ω1 > ω2|q1 ≥ q2] ≥ P[ω1 > ω2|q1 = q2] (3.30)
P[ω2 > ω1|q1 ≥ q2] ≤ P[ω2 > ω1|q1 = q2] (3.31)
Therefore:
P[ω1 > ω2|q1 ≥ q2] ≥ P[ω2 > ω1|q1 ≥ q2] (3.32)
As the products are interchangeable, P[ω2 > ω1|q1 ≥ q2] = P[ω1 > ω2|q2 ≥ q1],
therefore:
P[ω1 > ω2|q1 ≥ q2] ≥ P[ω1 > ω2|q2 ≥ q1] (3.33)
From which the theorem follows by Bayes’ theorem and the symmetric prior
on q1, q2. 
4. Model with Market Share Observations
We now generalize our model to the case where the market share of the products
is known to customers. Customers can base their partiality strategies on market
share information, as well as on their individual history with the products. We
need to define market share:
Let there be n customers and m products. qi denotes product i’s quality. Let
Zij ∈ Ht be customer j’s t-deep history with product i. We define a (t-deep)
history ensemble Z as a set of histories for each customer-product combination
Z := {Zij ∈ Ht, ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n]}.
The set of t-deep history ensembles is denoted by Gt.
Given a t-deep history ensemble Z, and an initial market shareA := (A1, . . . , Am),
the market share of product i ∈ [m] after round k is the total number of units con-
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sumed of product m up to round k, and is denoted by Ωi(Z,A, k):
Ωi(Z,A, k) = Ai +
n∑
j=1
con(Zkij) (4.1)
All customers are aware of the round-k market share of all products when they
make their consumption decisions at round k + 1.4
Ω(Z,A, k) denotes the vector of all product market shares
(Ω1(Z,A, k), . . . ,Ωm(Z,A, k)).
The initial market share vector A ≡ Ω(Z,A, 0) is the market share vector before
round 1, and its value is extraneous to the model.
The partiality strategy of customer j ∈ [n] to product i ∈ [m] after round t,
σij(Zij,Ω(Z,A, t)), is defined as the probability that the customer will consume
product i at round t+1. It is a behavioral strategy that depends on the customer’s
information set which consists of Zij, the customer’s history with product i, and
the market share Ω(Z,A, t) known after round t.
Mark q := (q1, . . . , qm). Define:
Si(Z) :=
n∑
j=1
S(Zij) (4.2)
Fi(Z) :=
n∑
j=1
F (Zij) (4.3)
Qi(Z; q) := q
Si(Z)
i (1− qi)
Fi(Z) (4.4)
Q(Z; q) :=
m∏
i=1
Qi(Z; q) (4.5)
We define monotonicity similarly to how we defined it in Section 2: A partiality
strategy σij is monotone if for every market share vector ω and for every history
pair Z1, Z2 satisfying Z1  Z2, σij(Z1, ω) ≥ σij(Z2, ω).
We introduce a condition on customers’ response to market data that we call
weak herding. As we show, if weak herding holds and if customers are monotone,
then a result similar to Theorem 3 holds. Namely, market share still indicates
quality.
A customer j is called weakly herding if for every product i, time t, t-deep
history Zij and market share vector ω = {ω1, . . . , ωm}, σij(Zij, ω) is non-decreasing
4See the Discussion for some comments on how things behave when customers may have more
information about past market shares.
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in ωi (and is independent of ωk for k 6= i). A customer j is called competitively
weakly herding if for every product i, time t, t-deep history Zij and market share
vector ω = {ω1, . . . , ωm}, σij(Zij, ω) is non-decreasing in ωi and non-increasing in
ωk for all k 6= i. In particular, a customer who, as in our basic model, is unaware
of market share or disregards it, is both weakly herding and competitively weakly
herding.
Weak herding is a natural response to market share data: The more a product
has been consumed, the more a customer who is aware of that fact is disposed
to consume it. Competitive weak herding makes it possible to base partiality
strategies on a product’s order in market share data, e.g. on whether or not a
product is the market leader in consumption. We shall be able to prove our thesis
for both kinds of responses, though for competitively weak herding we shall have
to limit the number of products.
Additionally, we define anonymity for products, the property that products
are a priori equal in the eyes of customers. For anonymous products, partiality
strategies do not depend on the label of a product but only on its data. Formally,
let ω = (ω1, ω2, . . . , ωm). Define the permutation K12(ω) := (ω2, ω1, ω3, . . . , ωm).
Then products 1, 2 are anonymous if, for each customer j, for each history Z ∈ H
and for each market share vector ω:
σ1j(Z, ω) = σ2j(Z,K12(ω)) (4.6)
5. Theorem with Market Share Observation
Theorem 4. 1. Assume that all customers are monotone and weakly herding
and fix some initial conditions A = (A1, . . . , Am). Then for all times t:
d
dq1
P
[
Ω1(Z,A, t) > Ω2(Z,A, t)|Z ∈ Gt
]
≥ 0 (5.1)
where qi ∈ [0, 1] is the quality of product i for i = 1, . . . , m, and the probability
space is G.
2. The same holds when all customers are competitively weakly herding, rather
than weakly herding, and there are two products (m = 2).
Proof. Our proof is modeled on the proof of Theorem 1, with changes:
Let q := (q1, q2, . . . , qm) and q
′ := (q′1, q
′
2, . . . , q
′
m) be two product quality vectors
satisfying q′1 > q1 and q2 = q
′
2, . . . , qm = q
′
m, so that q
′ is different from q only
in having better quality for product 1. For the proof, we will construct a joint
distribution of two types of history ensembles:
1. The distribution of history ensembles ∈ Gt under product qualities q. En-
sembles from this distribution are denoted by Z.
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2. The distribution of history ensembles ∈ Gt under product qualities q
′. En-
sembles from this distribution are denoted by Z’.
As before, the joint distribution is a proof technique and not a representation
of any real customer behavior.
The construction assigns to each pair of ensembles Z,Z ′ ∈ Gt a joint proba-
bility f(Z,Z ′) ∈ [0, 1]. Assuming f(Z,Z ′) to be tabulated in a table whose rows
correspond to values of Z and columns correspond to values of Z ′, a valid joint
distribution must have rows summing to the correct ensemble event probabilities
in both rows and columns, i.e. for every Z ∈ Gt:∑
Z′∈Gt
f(Z,Z ′) = P[Z; q] = c(Z)Q(Z; q) (5.2)
and for every Z ′ ∈ Gt:∑
Z∈Gt
f(Z,Z ′) = P[Z
′; q′] = c(Z ′)Q(Z ′; q′) (5.3)
Our construction restricts the joint distribution’s support (i.e. those pairs Z,Z ′
where f(Z,Z ′) > 0) by the following criterion:
Criterion 2. For every customer j ∈ [n], and round 0 < k ≤ t:
• There exists 0 < l ≤ k s.t. dig(Z ′l1j)  dig(Z
k
1j).
• For every product i ∈ [m], i 6= 1, there exists 0 < l ≤ k s.t. dig(Z lij) =
dig(Z ′kij). (In the case of weak herding, a fortiori, Z
k
ij = Z
′k
ij).
The following statements are all consequences of the criterion:
• con(Z ′k1j) ≥ con(Z
k
1j), while for every i 6= 1, con(Z
′k
ij) ≤ con(Z
k
ij)
• con(Z ′k1j) = con(Z
k
1j) ⇒ Z
′k
1j  Z
k
1j, while for every i 6= 1, con(Z
′k
ij) =
con(Zkij)⇒ Z
k
ij  Z
′k
ij.
• Ω1(Z
′, A, k) ≥ Ω1(Z,A, k), while for every i 6= 1, Ωi(Z
′, A, k) ≤ Ωi(Z,A, k).
• If monotonicity and either weak herding or competitively weak herding hold,
σ1j(Z
′,Ω(Z ′, A, k)) ≥ σ1j(Z,Ω(Z,A, k)).
• If monotonicity and either weak herding (for any number of products) or
competitively weak herding (for two products) hold, σij(Z
′,Ω(Z ′, A, k)) ≤
σij(Z,Ω(Z,A, k)). Note that it is here that the case m > 2 of competitively
weak herding breaks, since the presence of a 3rd product, whose market share
possibly decreased from Z to Z ′, would not allow drawing this consequence.
We specify the joint distribution in two different ways: In the first, it is specified
how the row marginal probabilities, i.e. probabilities of Z events, are split into the
row’s individual probabilties. The construction will explicitly guarantee (5.2) and
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Criterion 2. In the second, it is specified how the column marginal probabilities,
i.e. probabilities of Z ′ events, are split into the column’s individual probabilties.
The construction will explicitly guarantee (5.3) and Criterion 2. Finally, we will
demonstrate that the two constructions coincide and lead to the same probabilities,
thus proving that it is in fact a joint probability fulfilling (5.2), (5.3) and Criterion
2.
The first, row construction, is specified by:
Let Z,Z ′, X, Y ∈ Gt (to improve readability X will be used in place of Z, and
Y in place of Z ′), i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] and 0 < k ≤ t. We will define below probability
functions g3(X, Y, i, j, k), h3(X, Y, i, j, k). Based on these, the probabilities f(Z,Z
′)
will be given by:
g(X, Y, i, j, k) :=
[
g3(X, Y, i, j, k) Yij(k) 6= N
1− g3(X, Y, i, j, k) Yij(k) = N
]
(5.4)
h(X, Y, i, j, k) =

 h3(X, Y, i, j, k) Yij(k) = S1− h3(X, Y, i, j, k) Yij(k) = F
1 Yij(k) = N

 (5.5)
r(X, Y, i, j, k) := g(X, Y, i, j, k)h(X, Y, i, j, k) (5.6)
R(Z,Z ′) :=
m∏
i=1
n∏
j=1
t∏
k=1
r(Z,Z ′, i, j, k) (5.7)
f(Z,Z ′) := R(Z,Z ′)P[Z; q] (5.8)
From Equations (5.4) to (5.6) we derive:
r(X, Y, i, j, k) =

 g(X, Y, i, j, k)h(X, Y, i, j, k) Yij(k) = Sg(X, Y, i, j, k)[1− h(X, Y, i, j, k)] Yij(k) = F
1− g(X, Y, i, j, k) Yij(k) = N

 (5.9)
The three values of which sum to 1. It follows that for every given values of Zij
and Z ′k−1ij there holds
∑
r(Z,Z ′, i, j, k) = 1 where the sum is over Z ′ij = N, S and
F . By (5.7) it follows that: ∑
Z′∈Gt
R(Z,Z ′) = 1 (5.10)
from which (5.2) follows. Note that this holds regardless of the specific choice of
g3, h3, which come in next.
Mark c := con(Xk−1ij ), c
′ := con(Y k−1ij ), Σ(Z, k) := σij(Z
k
ij,Ω(Z,A, k))
g3(X, Y, i, j, k) =




[
1 Xij(k) 6= N
Σ(Y,k−1)−Σ(X,k−1)
1−Σ(X,k−1)
Xij(k) = N
]
i = 1[
0 Xij(k) = N
Σ(Y,k−1)
Σ(X,k−1)
Xij(k) 6= N
]
i 6= 1

 c = c′
Σ(Y, k − 1) c 6= c′


(5.11)
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h31(X, Y, i, j, k) =


[
1 [dig(Xij)](c+ 1) = S
q′
i
−qi
1−qi
[dig(Xij)](c+ 1) = F
]
c < con(Xij)
q′i c ≥ con(Xij)

 (5.12)
h3i(X, Y, i, j, k) =


[
1 [dig(Xij)](c+ 1) = S
q′
i
−qi
1−qi
[dig(Xij)](c+ 1) = F
]
c < con(Yij)
1 c ≥ con(Yij)

 (5.13)
h3(X, Y, i, j, k) =
[
h31(X, Y, i, j, k) i = 1
h3i(X, Y, i, j, k) i 6= 1
]
(5.14)
An examination of (5.4) to (5.14) leads to the following observations:
• The definition of g and g3 insures that in r’s support con(Z
′k
1j) ≥ con(Z
k
1j)
for every j ∈ [n], k ∈ [1, t], and con(Z ′kij) ≤ con(Z
k
ij) for every i ∈ [2, m],
j ∈ [n], k ∈ [1, t]. The definition of h and h3 insures that in r’s support
nowhere do l ∈ [1, con(Z)] [dig(Z)](l) = S and [dig(Z ′)](l) = F hold si-
multaneously. This is the definition of history superiority, denoted by the
relation . Consequently Criterion 2 holds in the support of f .
• The difference between (5.12) and (5.13) (compare with (3.14) and (3.22))
stems from the fact that for product 1, X ’s digest is shorter or equal to Y ’s,
while for other products, it is Y ’s digest that is shorter or equal.
• As q′i ≥ qi for every i ∈ [m], 0 ≤ h(Z,Z
′, i, j, k) ≤ 1. Also, as a consequence
of Criterion 2 is that Σ(Z ′, k − 1) ≥ Σ(Z, k − 1) for product 1 (i = 1), and
Σ(Z ′, k−1) ≤ Σ(Z, k−1) for other products (i 6= 1), 0 ≤ g(Z,Z ′, i, j, k) ≤ 1.
Therefore 0 ≤ R(Z,Z ′) ≤ 1 for every Z,Z ′ satisfying Criterion 2.
In summary, (5.8) defines a matrix f(Z,Z ′) of non-negative values, which may
be non-zero only where Criterion 2 holds, each row summing to the row marginal
probability of Z.
We now define a second construction based on columns (values of Z ′):
Let Z,Z ′, X, Y ∈ Gt, i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] and 0 < k ≤ t. We define below prob-
ability functions g4(X, Y, i, j, k), h4(X, Y, i, j, k). Based on these, the probabilities
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f(Z,Z ′) will be given by:
g′(X, Y, i, j, k) :=
[
g4(X, Y, i, j, k) Xij(k) 6= N
1− g4(X, Y, i, j, k) Xij(k) = N
]
(5.15)
h′(X, Y, i, j, k) =

 h4(X, Y, i, j, k) Xij(k) = S1− h4(X, Y, i, j, k) Xij(k) = F
1 Xij(k) = N

 (5.16)
r′(X, Y, i, j, k) := g′(X, Y, i, j, k)h′(X, Y, i, j, k) (5.17)
R′(Z,Z ′) :=
m∏
i=1
n∏
j=1
t∏
k=1
r′(Z,Z ′, i, j, k) (5.18)
f ′(Z,Z ′) := R′(Z,Z ′)P[Z
′; q′] (5.19)
An examination of (5.15) to (5.24) leads to observations similar to those noted
above for the first construction: There holds
∑
r′(Z,Z ′, k) = 1 where the sum is
over Zij(k) = N, S and F . By (5.18) it follows that:∑
Z∈Gt
R′(Z,Z ′) = 1 (5.20)
from which (5.3) follows. We define the functions g4 and h4:
Mark c := con(Xk−1ij ), c
′ := con(Y k−1ij ), Σ(Z, k) := σij(Z
k
ij,Ω(Z,A, k))
g4(X, Y, i, j, k) =




[
0 Yij(k) = N
Σ(X,k−1)
Σ(Y,k−1)
Yij(k) 6= N
]
i = 1[
1 Yij(k) 6= N
Σ(X,k−1)−Σ(Y,k−1)
1−Σ(Y,k−1)
Yij(k) = N
]
i 6= 1

 c = c′
Σ(X, k − 1) c 6= c′


(5.21)
h41(X, Y, i, j, k) =


[
0 [dig(Yij)](c+ 1) = F
qi
q′
i
[dig(Yij)](c+ 1) = S
]
c < con(Xij)
1 c ≥ con(Xij)

 (5.22)
h4i(X, Y, i, j, k) =


[
0 [dig(Yij)](c+ 1) = F
qi
q′
i
[dig(Yij)](c+ 1) = S
]
c < con(Yij)
qi c ≥ con(Yij)

 (5.23)
h4(X, Y, i, j, k) =
[
h41(X, Y, i, j, k) i = 1
h4i(X, Y, i, j, k) i 6= 1
]
(5.24)
The choice of g4 guarantees that in r
′’s support the market share requirements
of Criterion 2 holds, while the choice of h4 guarantees that the monotonicity re-
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quirements of Criterion 2 also holds. As q′i ≥ qi, 0 ≤ h
′(Z,Z ′, i, j, k) ≤ 1, and from
monotonicity and (competitive) weak herding it follows that 0 ≤ g′(Z,Z ′, i, j, k) ≤
1. Therefore 0 ≤ R′(Z,Z ′) ≤ 1 for every Z,Z ′ satisfying Criterion 2.
In summary, (5.15) through (5.24) define a matrix f ′(Z,Z ′) of non-negative
values, which may be non-zero only where Criterion 2 holds, each column summing
to the column marginal probability of Z ′.
We now show that both constructions generate the same probabilities, f(Z,Z ′) =
f ′(Z,Z ′), and that therefore the construction is for a joint probability with Crite-
rion 2 for its support:
We use (5.4) and (5.15) to calculate that where Z,Z ′ obey Criterion 2:5
g(Z,Z ′, i, j, k)
g′(Z,Z ′, i, j, k)
=


1−Σ(Z′,k−1)
1−Σ(Z,k−1)
Z ′ij(k) = N,Zij(k) = N
1−Σ(Z′,k−1)
Σ(Z,k−1)
Z ′ij(k) = N,Zij(k) 6= N
Σ(Z′,k−1)
1−Σ(Z,k−1)
Z ′ij(k) 6= N,Zij(k) = N
Σ(Z′,k−1)
Σ(Z,k−1)
Z ′ij(k) 6= N,Zij(k) 6= N

 =
cij(Z
′k
ij)
cij(Z ′
k−1
ij )
/ cij(Zkij)
cij(Z
k−1
ij )
(5.25)
For each i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n], we define a pairing [1, t] 7→ [1, t], based on Zij , Z
′
ij.
The following describes the pairing for product 1:
• The rounds where Zij has a consumption event (Zij(k) 6= N) are paired with
the corresponding rounds of the first con(Zij) consumption events in Z
′
ij . I.e.
if con(Zk−1ij ) = con(Z
′k
′−1
ij ) = l−1, con(Z
k
ij) = con(Z
′k
′
ij ) = l, then k is paired
with k′.
• Any con(Z ′ij) − con(Zij) N -rounds of Zij are paired with rounds of the
[con(Zij) + 1]’th to con(Z
′
ij)’th consumption event in Z
′
ij .
• The remaining t− con(Z ′ij) rounds of Zij and Z
′
ij are all N -rounds, and are
paired in any order.
For products other than 1, use the above pairing, but exchange Zij for Z
′
ij ,
and vice versa (the reason being that it is Z ′ij instead of Zij that has the shorter
digest).
We use (5.5) and (5.16) to calculate that where Z,Z ′ obey Criterion 2, and
5i.e. except for the cases c = c′, i = 1, Z(k) 6= N,Z ′(k) = N and c = c′, i 6= 1, Z(k) =
N,Z ′(k) 6= N , where the expression evalutes to 0
0
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k → k′ is part of the above pairing:
h(Z,Z ′, i, j, k′)
h′(Z,Z ′, i, j, k)
=




1
1−qi
Zij(k) = F
1
qi
Zij(k) = S
1 Zij(k) = N

 Z ′ij(k′) = N

1−q′
i
1−qi
Zij(k) = F
1−q′
i
qi
Zij(k) = S
1− q′i Zij(k) = N

 Z ′ij(k′) = F


q′
i
1−qi
Zij(k) = F
q′
i
qi
Zij(k) = S
q′i Zij(k) = N

 Z ′ij(k′) = S


=
Q(Z ′k
′
ij ; q
′
i)
Q(Z ′k
′−1
ij ; q
′
i)
/ Q(Zkij; qi)
Q(Zk−1ij ; qi)
(5.26)
Combining (5.7), (5.18), (5.25) and (5.26), we calculate:
R(Z,Z ′)
R′(Z,Z ′)
=
c(Z ′)
c(Z)
Q(Z ′; q′)
Q(Z; q)
=
P[Z ′; q′]
P[Z; q]
(5.27)
Recalling (5.8), (5.19) we conclude f(Z,Z ′) = f ′(Z,Z ′). Therefore the two
constructions are the same, as we sought to show, and therefore form a joint
distribution with support given by Criterion 2.
The theorem now follows: In the joint distribution matrix, consider a minor
with rows for which Ω1(Z,A, t) > Ω2(Z,A, t), and columns for which Ω1(Z
′, A, t) >
Ω2(Z
′, A, t). Since a consequence of Criterion 2 is that Ω1(Z
′, A, t) ≥ Ω1(Z,A, t)
and Ω2(Z
′, A, t) ≤ Ω2(Z,A, t), the minor contains all the support of each included
row. Therefore: ∑
Ω1(Z,A,t)>Ω2(Z,A,t)
P[Z; q] ≤
∑
Ω1(Z′,A,t)>Ω2(Z′,A,t)
P[Z
′; q′] (5.28)
Since this is true for any q′1 > q1, P
[
Ω1(Z,A, t) > Ω2(Z,A, t)|Z ∈ Gt
]
is non-
decreasing in q1, as the theorem asserts. 
We now state and prove the main result:
Theorem 5. 1. Let there be m products, and let products 1, 2 be anonymous
but have possibly different qualities q1, q2 respectively, with symmetric prior
on their quality and initial market share. Let all customers have monotone
partiality strategies to these products, and let all customers be weakly herding.
Let ω1, ω2 be the observed market share after time t of 1 and 2, respectively.
Then:
P[q1 ≥ q2|ω1 > ω2] ≥ P[q2 ≥ q1|ω1 > ω2] (5.29)
2. The same holds when all customers are competitively weakly herding, rather
than weakly herding, and there are two products (m = 2).
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Proof. The observed market share is the result of some history ensemble Z ∈ Gt
and some initial market share vector A = (A1, . . . , Am), such that:
ω1 = Ω1(Z,A, t) (5.30)
ω2 = Ω2(Z,A, t) (5.31)
As the two products are anonymous, and the market share prior is symmetric,
we must have P[ω1 > ω2|q1 = q2] = P[ω2 > ω1|q1 = q2]. By theorem 4:
P[ω1 > ω2|q1 ≥ q2] ≥ P[ω1 > ω2|q1 = q2] (5.32)
P[ω2 > ω1|q1 ≥ q2] ≤ P[ω2 > ω1|q1 = q2] (5.33)
Therefore:
P[ω1 > ω2|q1 ≥ q2] ≥ P[ω2 > ω1|q1 ≥ q2] (5.34)
By anonymity, P[ω2 > ω1|q1 ≥ q2] = P[ω1 > ω2|q2 ≥ q1], therefore:
P[ω1 > ω2|q1 ≥ q2] ≥ P[ω1 > ω2|q2 ≥ q1] (5.35)
from which the theorem follows by Bayes’ theorem and the symmetric prior on
q1, q2.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
We proved that market share indicates quality in the context of a model where
customers base their strategy on their history with products and on market share
data, under fairly weak restrictions on their behavior.
One consequence of the result is its guidance to the behavior of the customers
themselves: A new customer, with no previous experience of the products, is
advised to put her trust in market share data available. In a market in which
customer-product interaction is one-shot, and all customers are equally informed
about market share, all rational customers should behave alike.
The framework we used in deriving our results can be naturally generalized.
While the restrictions of monotonicity and weak herding were successful for reach-
ing the result, we do not claim that our formulation is the only one possible.
Different formulations may be attempted, perhaps introducing other considera-
tions into customer strategy. It should be apparent that generalizing our result
would require definition of criteria similar to Criteria 1 and 2, and constructing
distributions whose support adhere to these new criteria.
For example, we believe that the requirement that all customers obey weak
herding is too strict, and that some level of elitist customer behavior does not,
in itself, invalidate the result. Namely, so long as elitism is outweighed (in some
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sense, to be defined) by herding behavior, inferences from market share to quality
remain valid.
If elitism becomes the norm, this may not be true, as is illustrated by the
following simple albeit artificial example:
Example 1. Let there be two products 1 and 2, with 1 the superior product: q1 >
q2. Let there be n customers, divided into two categories. Customer 1’s partiality
strategy to each product is 1 if she has no prior history with the product or if her
last experience with it was good, and 0 otherwise. Customer 1’s strategy ignores
market share. Customers 2 to n, on the other hand, are pure elitists: They will
consume a product unconditionally unless that product is a leader in market share,
in which case they will not consume it. The initial market share is A = {0, 0}.
We analyze this to show that, on the 3rd round, market share does not indicate
quality.
On the 1st round all customers consume all products. The market share after
the round is ω = {n, n}, so there is no market leader.
On the 2nd round, customers 2 to n will consume all products. Customer 1,
however, will do so only if her last round was a success. With probability q1(1−q2)
product 1 will lead in market share, while with a smaller probability q2(1 − q1)
(since q1 > q2) product 2 will lead in market share. In other cases (probability
q1q2 + (1− q1)(1− q2)), market share parity will continue.
On the 3rd round, if any product has larger market share, the elitists will stop
consuming it, but will continue consuming the other product. The result will be
that at the end of the round, market leadership will be reversed. As 1 is the better
product, and assuming n large enough, the conclusion is that at the end of round
3 higher market share indicates lower quality.
This example is artificial, inter alia, in that the negative result depends on the
round number. In the example, market share leadership will oscillate, and even
rounds will behave differently from odd rounds. We have not been able to find an
economically realistic scenario that invalidates our central thesis.
Another generalization is by the introduction of money, which does not play
a role in our current model due to the assumption of an undifferentiated market.
This may be readily achieved by factoring price into quality, so that customer
satisfaction is tied to perceived “value for money”. It is not necessary for all
customers to have the same sensitivity to price: The generalization (“market share
indicates value for money”) clearly holds if all customers, were they fully informed
about product qualities, agree that a certain product is preferable to another.
We were able to prove the case with competitively weak herding for two prod-
ucts only. Whether the result in fact holds for 3 products or more needs to be
clarified. If the answer turns out to be negative, it will be interesting whether an
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alternative for competitively weak herding exists in which customers are respon-
sive to market share ranking and for which the main result holds for any number
of products.
Our analysis assumed that customers are aware of current market share only.
What happens if we allow for awareness of historic market share values? There
are two aspects to this: First, in the influence of market share data on customer
strategies: We defined weak herding as a restriction on customers’ response to
current market share. If this definition of weak herding remains unchanged, then
a weak-herding customer, even if aware of historic market share data, may only
use it as a tie-breaker in forming her strategies. It should be apparent that this
does not disturb the validity of the results, as stated. Second, and however, the
statement “market share indicates quality”, interpreted as a statement about the
probability of better quality conditional on market share data not restricted to
current data, may be invalid. This is especially true if customers are aware of
trends. E.g. the leader in a market may be seen to be losing ground, while the
follower is seen to be gaining ground.
We modeled quality as an unchanging attribute of a product. What happens if
quality varies between rounds? The main result becomes moot. However it may be
asked whether the intermediate results that show that market share is monotoni-
cally non-decreasing in the quality (Theorems 1 and 4) remain true. Differentials
in the quality may be replaced by partial differentials in any particular round’s
quality. The answer to this turns out to be negative in the general case. (For
observe, e.g., that the pairing used in (3.24) means that product qualities from
different periods are compared. This may cause the construction to fail by having
negative joint probabilities. Interestingly, this problem does not exist, and so our
results still hold, if product qualities are variable but non-increasing in time).
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